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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Nancy Michelle Hartsock appeals from the judgment entered upon her
guilty plea to drawing a check without funds. Hartsock argues the district court
abused its discretion when it denied her motion to withdraw her guilty plea.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The state charged Hartsock with burglary, drawing a check without funds,
and petit theft.

(R., pp. 19-20.)

Hartsock agreed to waive her preliminary

hearing and plead guilty to the drawing a check without funds charge pursuant to
1
an Alford plea, and the state agreed to dismiss the burglary and petit theft

charges. (R., pp. 40, 42-52.) The state also agreed to recommend a suspended
sentence of one year fixed plus two years indeterminate, and to recommend no
more than 90 days in local jail. (R., p. 47.) Hartsock was free to argue for a
different

sentence.

(Id.)

Hartsock

filled

out

and

signed

both

an

Acknowledgement of Alford Plea and a Guilty Plea Advisory and Form. (R., pp.
42-52; 1/28/15 Tr., p. 7, L. 7 – p. 9, L. 12.) The court questioned Hartsock and
her attorney regarding the guilty plea and found it was made knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently. (R., pp. 55-56.)
THE COURT: At the end of the Guilty Plea Advisory Form, you’ve
also signed it looks like on the 23rd of this month and your attorney
has signed below you on today’s date January the 28th. And did
you sign with the intent of presenting this document to me as one
whole document that you wish the court to consider?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
1

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)
1

THE COURT: Okay, Ms. Jensen, are you convinced that your
client understands her rights, as well as the significance of waiving
those rights and entering a guilty plea?
MS. JENSEN: I do, Your Honor.
THE COURT: To the charge that I’ve arraigned you on which is
drawing a check on a closed account or an account with no funds
in it, in violation of Idaho Code 18-3106(a), which is a felony, are
you now pleading guilty pursuant to the Alford doctrine?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Has anyone made any threats or promises to you to
get you to plead guilty, other than those that are specifically set
forth in the written plea agreement that we’ve been talking about?
A. No, sir.
THE COURT: You understand that by pleading guilty, you’re
waiving a number of important rights, perhaps most importantly is
your right to require the State to prove your guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt at a jury trial.
A. Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right then. I do accept your plea as knowing,
voluntary and intelligent. …
(1/28/15 Tr., p. 9, L. 6 – p. 10, L. 11.) The court then scheduled a sentencing
hearing for March 20, 2015. (1/28/15 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 10-14.) The day before the
sentencing hearing, the parties stipulated to continue the sentencing because
Hartsock was “working on resolving other legal matters in Montana” and the
district court reset the hearing for April 21, 2015. (R., pp. 66-68.)
On April 20, 2015, the day before the continued hearing, Hartsock moved
to continue her sentencing hearing again because she did “not have
transportation to make it to court.” (R., pp. 69-70.) The court set her sentencing
for May 5, 2015. (R., pp. 71.)
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On May 4, 2015, the day before her new sentencing hearing, Hartsock
moved to withdraw her guilty plea. (R., pp. 72-73.) The district court held a
hearing on Hartsock’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea.

(R., pp. 74-75.)

Hartsock argued that she should be allowed to withdraw her guilty plea because
“she is not guilty and regrets making the entry of guilty plea pursuant to Alford at
the time of her preliminary hearing.” (5/5/15 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 5-12.)
The district court determined that Hartsock failed to provide a sufficient
basis to withdraw her guilty plea. (5/5/15 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 13-20.) The district court
also found that the state would be prejudiced if Hartsock were permitted to
withdraw her guilty plea because the state dismissed charges as part of the plea
agreement and the state would not be able to re-file. (5/5/15 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 524.) The district court denied Hartsock’s motion. (R., pp. 74-75, 82.)
The district court sentenced Hartsock to one year fixed and two years
indeterminate, and retained jurisdiction.

(R., pp. 76-80.)

The district court

recommended that Hartsock be placed in the Corrective Alternative Placement
(CAPP) rider program. (R., p. 77.) The district court entered judgment. (R., pp.
76-80.)
Hartsock moved for reconsideration of her sentence under Idaho Criminal
Rule 35. (R., pp. 83-87.) After a hearing, the district court denied the Rule 35
motion. (R., pp. 88-89, 98-101.) The district court held, in part, that “Hartsock is
in desperate need of treatment, and that participation in CAPP offers her the
best opportunity for rehabilitation.” (R., p. 100.) Hartsock timely appealed. (R.,
pp. 93-95.)
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ISSUE
Hartsock states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Ms. Hartsock’s
motion to withdraw her guilty plea?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Hartsock failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it
denied her motion to withdraw her guilty plea?
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ARGUMENT
Hartsock Has Failed To Demonstrate The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Denying Hartsock’s Motion To Withdraw Her Guilty Plea
A.

Introduction
Hartsock pled guilty pursuant to an Alford plea. (R., pp. 55-56.) After

Hartsock examined the recommendation contained within the PSI, Hartsock
moved to withdraw her guilty plea. (R., pp. 72-73.) Hartsock argued that she
should be allowed to withdraw her guilty plea because she regretted her guilty
plea and she thought she was not guilty. (5/15/15 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 5-12.) The
district court rejected her argument and found she failed to present a just cause
to withdraw her guilty plea. (R., p. 82; 5/5/15 Tr., p. 16, L. 13 p. 17, L. 24.)
On appeal, Hartsock repeats the argument made by her trial counsel.
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-6.) Hartsock has failed to show the district court
abused its discretion when it denied her motion to withdraw her guilty plea.
B.

Standard Of Review
It is within the discretion of the trial court whether to grant or deny a

motion to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535, 211
P.3d 775, 780 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959,
801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990)). The district court’s discretion should be
liberally exercised. See State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281,
284 (1990). “Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is
limited to whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as
distinguished from arbitrary action.” Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535-536, 211 P.3d
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at 780-781 (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941 P.2d 330, 334
(Ct. App. 1997)).
C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion When It Denied
Hartsock’s Motion To Withdraw Her Guilty Plea
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be made before sentence is

imposed. I.C.R. 33(c). The presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an
automatic right, however.

Carrasco, 117 Idaho at 298, 787 P.2d at 284;

Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780. The defendant bears the burden
of proving, in the district court, that the plea should be withdrawn. Hanslovan,
147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780; Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 374-375, 825
P.2d 94, 97-98 (Ct. App. 1992). In ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea,
the district court must determine, as a threshold matter, whether the plea was
entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 536,
211 P.3d at 781; Rodriguez, 118 Idaho at 959, 801 P.2d at 1310. As a matter of
constitutional due process, a plea is knowing and voluntary if it is “entered by
one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any
commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel.” Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).
If the plea was voluntary, in the constitutional sense, then the court must
determine whether other just cause exists to allow the defendant to withdraw the
plea. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781. The good faith, credibility,
and weight of the defendant’s assertions in support of her motion to withdraw her
plea are matters for the trial court to decide. Id. at 537, 211 P.3d at 782. When
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the motion is presented after the defendant has learned of the content of the PSI
or has received other information about the probable sentence, the district court
may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant’s apparent motive. State v.
Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App. 2004).
Here, Hartsock made her motion to withdraw her guilty plea after she
learned of the contents of the PSI. (5/5/15 Tr., p. 15, L. 1 – p. 17, L. 4.) In
denying Hartsock’s motion, the district court noted that Hartsock’s plea was
made pursuant to Alford and that there was “a written plea in the file and a
written Alford plea; fairly exhaustive plea.” (5/5/15 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 17-23.) The
court also noted that Hartsock and the court went over the plea “extensively” at
the time Hartsock entered it, and Hartsock did not present any valid basis to
withdraw the guilty plea. (5/5/15 Tr., p. 16, L. 24 – p. 17, L. 4.) The court was
“concerned that [Hartsock] received the Presentence Report and [was not] very
happy with the recommendation because the Presentence did recommend
retain[ed] jurisdiction,” as opposed to probation and local jail time, as
contemplated by the plea agreement. (5/5/15 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 17-24; compare PSI,
pp. 16, 20 (classifying Hartsock as high risk to reoffend and recommendation
retained jurisdiction) with R., p. 47 (prosecutor bound by plea agreement to
recommend suspend sentence and no more than 90 days local jail).) The district
court held that Hartsock’s regrets at making the plea and her claims of innocence
did not constitute a basis to withdraw the guilty plea, especially since the motion
was made after Hartsock learned of the contents and recommendations of the
PSI. (5/5/15 Tr., p. 16, L. 8 – p. 17, L. 4.) As the district court stated, “But not
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liking the recommendation … the presentence investigator made is not a valid
reason to withdraw your plea.” (5/5/15 Tr., p. 16, L. 24 – p. 17, L. 1.)
The district court also found that the state would be prejudiced if Hartsock
were permitted to withdraw the guilty plea because as a result of the plea deal,
Hartsock was released from custody and the state dismissed a misdemeanor
and a felony charge and the state “wouldn’t be able to re-file that charge.”
(5/5/15 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 13-24.)
On appeal, Hartsock repeats the arguments of her trial counsel. (See
Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-6.)

Hartsock reiterates the argument that her regret

regarding her guilty plea and claimed innocence constitute a “just reason” to
withdraw her guilty plea. (Id). Hartsock also argues that the district court erred
in finding prejudice to the state because the “State has not shown prejudice
because there is no reason to believe that the State would be unable to refile the
previously dismissed charges.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) Even if the state does
not show prejudice, Hartsock was still required to present and support a
plausible reason to withdraw her guilty plea. See Mayer, 139 Idaho at 647, 84
P.3d at 583 (“A defendant’s failure to present and support a plausible reason will
dictate against granting withdrawal, even absent prejudice to the prosecution.”
(citation omitted)).
On appeal, Hartsock has failed to show the district court abused its
discretion. “When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the
lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the
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lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with
any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether
the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Hanslovan, 147
Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780 (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768
P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).
The district court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion.
(5/5/15 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 13-16) (“The decision whether to grant or deny a motion –
that motion would be within the discretion of the district and it would be governed
by Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c).”). The district court acted within the boundaries of
such discretion and consistently with the applicable legal standards. The court
denied the motion, which was within the boundaries of the discretion and the
district court acted consistently with the applicable legal standards, namely Idaho
Criminal Rule 33(c). (See 5/5/15 Tr., p. 14, L. 9 – p. 17, L. 4.) The district court
recognized that Hartsock was required to show a “just reason” to withdraw the
guilty plea. (See Id.) The district court also correctly concluded that Hartsock’s
mere protestation of innocence, after reviewing the PSI, was not a just reason to
withdraw her plea. See, e.g., State v. Akin, 139 Idaho 160, 162-163, 75 P.3d
214, 216-217 (Ct. App. 2003) (“A declaration of innocence does not entitle a
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea. … If mere assertion of legal innocence were
always a sufficient condition for withdrawal, withdrawal would effectively be an
automatic right.”). Finally, the district court reached its decision by an exercise of
reason. The district court examined the file and the extensive and exhaustive
plea, and the district court examined the argument proffered by Hartsock. (See
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5/5/15 Tr., p. 14, L. 9 – p. 17, L. 4.) Hartsock failed to provide the district court
just cause to justify withdrawing her valid guilty plea. On appeal, Hartsock has
repeated the rejected argument made by trial counsel and has failed to show the
district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to withdraw her
guilty plea.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the
district court.
DATED this 15th day of April, 2016.
_Ted S. Tollefson______
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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